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I. INTRODUCTION  
On April 18, 1775, two messengers rode parallel routes from Charleston to 
Lexington, Massachusetts to warn Patriot leaders in towns along the way of approaching 
British troops. Paul Revere arrived in Lexington a half hour before the other rider, 
William Dawes, and was the first to warn John Hancock and Samuel Adams.  Revere was 
not only quicker to the punch, but also more effective.1  In The Tipping Point, Malcolm 
Gladwell describes Revere as the “man with the biggest Rolodex in colonial Boston” who 
knew exactly who to notify in each town.  Messages from the less well-connected Dawes, 
on the other hand, failed to generate as much traction as “not one person from any of 
those towns made it to the first day of fighting.”2  Not surprisingly, disseminating and 
acting upon information quickly remains critical to threat response today, especially in 
counterterrorism.  Even President Bush highlights the importance of getting information 
out, as Revere did, to “the right people…in the right places.”3  In essence, knowledge 
becomes power in the hands of those with the know-how to use it effectively. 
In order to deal with the problem of terrorism—from prevention and detection to 
incident response—a diverse pool of organizations must act.  The problem is an example 
of what Laurence O’Toole describes as a “wicked problem” which cannot be handled by 
dividing requirements into “simple pieces in near isolation from each other.”  Based on 
that, O’Toole concludes that “policies dealing with ambitious or complex issues are 
likely to require networked structures.”4  At the national level, some organizations have 
moved in that direction.  A myriad of organizational changes yielded the Department of 
Homeland Security, US Northern Command, and a wellspring of terrorism-specific 
offices and inter-organizational coordinating groups in federal agencies and departments.  
                                                 1 Rod Paschall, ed., “Paul Revere's True Account of the Midnight Ride,” Military History Quarterly, 
Summer 2003.  [journal online]; available from http://www.thehistorynet.com/mhq/blmidnightride/.  
Internet; accessed 1 Feb 06. 
2 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point (UK:  Back Bay Books, 2000), 23. 
3 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address.  Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.  Internet; accessed 1 Feb 06. 
4 Laurence J. O’Toole, “Treating Networks Seriously,” Public Administration Review 57, No. 1 
(1997): 45-52.  ProQuest; accessed 1 Feb 06.  O’Toole attributes the “wicked problem” term to Rittel and 
Webber, “Dilemmas in General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1984). 
2 
At the national level, the complexity of the problem is certainly apparent.  Below that, 
states and localities have attempted to parse the problem and focus their preparedness and 
response somewhat to geographic areas of responsibility; however, most terrorism-related 
issues still require inter-organizational coordination outside local jurisdictions. 
Los Angeles (LA) was among the first of the metropolitan areas to rise to the 
challenge when it embarked on a pioneering inter-organizational counterterrorism 
approach.  From its initiation in preparation for the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics 
and later founding of the Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism (LATFOT) to its present 
structure as the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), the 
organization implemented a networked approach to counterterrorism which is now 
emulated throughout the United States.5 
Although it is difficult to quantify counterterrorism success, in the case of the 
TEW, the organization has been assessed as a qualified success according to Program 
Logic Model criteria.  This model compares an organization’s activities with its stated 
operational objectives; it assumes that successful organizations synchronize their 
activities with their objectives.6  Beyond its assessed objective “success” according to 
that model, what is not known is how it evolved as a collaborative network. 
The objective of this study is to answer this question in terms of the focal 
organization—the TEW, then apply the findings to other counterterrorism efforts.  The 
first two chapters set the stage to answer this question.  Chapter II surveys existing 
literature and reviews the need for inter-organizational collaboration, especially at the 
local level.  This chapter also provides a foundational look at network theory. Chapter III 
introduces social network analysis (SNA) techniques that are used in the methodology for 
this study.  Following that, SNA is used to map the growth of the TEW specifically.  In 
                                                 5 Ronald Iden, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on 
Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations.  Available from 
http://www2.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/iden032802.htm.  Internet; accessed 1 Feb 06. 
6 Michael Grossman, Perception or Fact: Measuring the Performance of the Terrorism Early Warning 
(TEW) Group (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005).  LA County Sheriff Department Commander 
Grossman applied a Program Logic Model to verify linkages between the TEW’s organizational objectives 
and its activities and determined the TEW to be a “success.”  Commander Grossman’s thesis provides the 
starting point for this study. 
3 
the final chapter, observations from the TEW case are extrapolated to broader inter-
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5 
II. THE INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION PROBLEM  
This chapter surveys the literature to reveal the need for research on the evolution 
of collaborative networks.  Although many studies address how the process of 
cooperation begins, far fewer discuss what happens after cooperative frameworks 
develop.  A cursory review of the problem and current research on interagency 
cooperation sets the stage for more in-depth analysis of the limits of current theory and 
the need for research on how organizations collaborate over time. 
 
A. BARRIERS TO PUBLIC SECTOR COLLABORATION  
Ironically, part of the interagency coordination problem faced by the public sector 
stems from the inherent design of American government.  James Wilson notes that the 
separation of powers, originally intended to balance the branches, creates a fragmented 
and often chaotic government.7  In addition to the notion of separation of powers, Eugene 
Bardach cites federalism and the “American ethos of pluralist democracy” to explain why 
neighboring communities often form specialized, mutually exclusive governmental 
structures to deal with public problems, despite the fact that the problems transcend 
geographic boundaries.8  American institutions are--by design--not optimized for quick, 
coordinated action on complex issues.  This built-in institutional quirk applies not only at 
the national level, but also at state and local levels. 
After 9/11, however, numerous reports and executive orders officially called for 
cooperation to overcome challenges created by parochial organizational mindsets. The 
Homeland Security Information Security Act states, “all appropriate agencies shall share 
homeland security information with federal agencies and appropriate state and local 
personnel.”9  To achieve this goal, new organizations and interagency committees were 
established to enable cooperation at all levels of government.  The problem of inter-
                                                 7 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989), 376. 
8 Eugene Bardach,. Getting Agencies to Work Together:  The Practice and Theory of Managerial 
Craftsmanship (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 11. 
9 US GAO, Combating Terrorism:  Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the 
Overseas Threat, GAO Report GAO-03-165 (Washington:  GPO, 23 May 2003), 53. 
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organizational cooperation regarding terrorism, however, is no small task, given the 
“30,000 units of local government, 18,000 local police organizations, 30,000 fire 
departments, 3,400 county governments” and countless other organizations involved in 
counterterrorism and emergency response.10  Even when some of those localities 
coordinate, the risk of duplication of effort remains. 
In addition, if organizations overcome cultural and political biases and actually want 
to coordinate, technical barriers may still impede collaboration.  President Bush’s 2004 
Executive Order Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 
Americans calls for improvements in information dissemination, declassification and 
compartmentalization to enable better collaborative efforts across agencies’ boundaries 
and through federal, state and local levels of government.11  Information flow between 
national agencies and states and localities (both up and down) remains troublesome.  A 
2003 Markle Foundation Task Force report recommends improved government 
networking. 
The sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant agencies at 
different levels of government has been only marginally improved in the 
last year, and remains haphazard and still overly dependent on the ad hoc 
‘sneaker net’ of personal relations among known colleagues.12 
An effective network linking federal, state and local government and coordinating on 
homeland security may be needed; however, details on how best to achieve such a 




                                                 10 William V. Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness:  Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, No. 1 (2005).  Available at 
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss1/5.  Internet; accessed 8 Jul 05. 
11 George W. Bush, Executive Order Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 
Americans, 27 Aug 04 Press Release.  Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/ 
print/20040827.html.  Internet; accessed 8 Jul 05. 
12 Markle Foundation Task Force.  Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security, 
December 2003: 2.  Available at http://www.markle.org/markle_programs/policy_for_a_networked_ 
society/national_security/projects/taskforce_national_ security.php#report1.  Internet; accessed 5 Nov 05. 
7 
B. INTRICACIES OF LOCAL SECURITY COOPERATION  
The complex problem of local cooperation provides fertile ground for research.  
H. George Frederickson suggests that studies of metropolitan-level cooperation, in 
particular, shed light on the difficulties of inter-organizational coordination.  
Frederickson notes that at the local level 
one can find most of the features of the disarticulated state—the declining 
salience of jurisdiction, the fuzziness of borders, a growing asymmetry in 
the relationship between the governed and those who govern, and an 
erosion of the capacity of the jurisdiction to contain and, thereby, manage 
complex social, economic, and political issues.13   
Given that, he concludes “the metropolitan area is the best empirical referent” for 
understanding inter-organizational aspects of public administration.14  Bardach 
compliments this argument by emphasizing how limited resources drive collaboration, 
especially between localities.  In cases where problems are cross-jurisdictional, solutions 
necessitate collaboration to save precious resources and increase efficiency.  Such 
collaboration creates “economies of scale” where funds spent on emergency services, for 
example, may be pooled in support of several localities.15  In addition, beyond the issue 
of resources, because many problems are “bigger than any single organization, 
collaborating with other organizations is necessary if there is any hope of making 
progress.”16   
Despite seemingly logical reasons for collaboration, interagency cooperation has 
not come easily.  In many cases, less than optimal structures are being used to achieve 
interagency collaboration on homeland security.   
Collaboration for homeland security is occurring in the context of under-
designed institutional relationships.  Leaders and interagency collaborative 
teams must therefore work to create novel processes, systems, protocols, 
and networks. They are faced with tasks of overcoming likely institutional 
barriers resulting from unique and partially conflicting missions, goals and 
                                                 13 H. George Frederickson, “The Repositioning of American Public Administration,” Political Science 
and Politics 32, No. 4 (Dec 99): 707.  JSTOR; accessed 3 Nov 05. 
14 Frederickson, 707. 
15 Bardach, 12. 
16 Jorg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 13, No. 4 (Oct 03): 413-414. 
8 
incentives, and they need to facilitate and enable organizational 
collaboration through processes we have categorized in an interagency 
design framework.17 
Down the road, organizations embarking on cooperative frameworks must determine how 
to build and sustain momentum for inter-organizational collaboration. 
Naim Kapucu argues that a process perspective on collaboration is useful, 
especially in the realm of terrorism and emergency response management.  Kapucu 
follows post-9/11 emergency response and recovery cooperation between public and 
private sector organizations.  Kapucu follows Grossman’s arguments on the need for 
cooperation and collaboration in counterterrorism and notes the importance of trust and 
the development of relationships between organizations over time.  He suggests that 
organizational interdependencies are well documented.  Beyond well-documented 
budgetary and resource interdependency issues, Kapucu says more research is needed on 
“organizational adaptation over time in dynamic environments.”18  Such research, in turn, 
compliments theories on conditions under which cooperation and collaboration begin by 
revealing variables required for collaborative processes to continue and flourish. 
 
C. COLLABORATION THEORY  
Various definitions exist for the related terms ‘collaboration,’ ‘cooperation,’ and 
‘coordination.’  Although related, different meanings exist between the terms.  The focus 
of this study is on collaboration, beyond mere cooperation or coordination.  Bardach 
defines collaboration as “any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to 
increase public value by their working together rather than separately.”19  Robert Axelrod 
derived conditions under which cooperation arises—perceptions of continued long-term 
contact between parties and the belief that cooperation and reciprocation are in their best 
                                                 17 Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative Capacity:  An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Innovation Through Collaboration:  Advances 
in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Elsevier Series 13, forthcoming 2006. 
18 Naim Kapucu,  “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context: Networks in Emergency 
Response Management.” Connections 26, No. 2 (2005): 46.  Available at http://www.insna.org/ 
Connections-Web/Volume 26-2/4.Kapucu.pdf.  Internet; accessed 11 Nov 05. 
19 Bardach, 8. 
9 
interest.20  Cooperation and coordination may be requirements for collaboration or be 
considered key actions as part of inter-organizational collaboration processes; however, 
the broader concept of collaboration subsumes coordination and cooperation. 
With respect to terrorism, Pelfrey defines collaboration as “agencies, 
organizations, and individuals from many tiers of public and private sectors, working, 
training, and exercising together for the common purpose of preventing terrorist threats to 
people or property.”21  Kenneth Thomas’s multidimensional approach to conflict 
management defines collaboration as one of five conflict-handling modes resulting from 
varying levels of cooperativeness and assertiveness.  Collaboration maximizes both 
assertiveness and cooperation, and it encourages integrative “win-win” solutions.  In such 
situations, the needs of all parties are met to the greatest extent possible.  Less than total 
cooperation yields partial concessions and suboptimal results whereas collaboration 
optimizes outcomes for all parties. 22 
Several scholars, such as Pelfrey, take the theory one step further to examine not 
only preconditions and changes from initial collaborative efforts, but also “adaptive 
processes” which yield varying levels of collaboration over time.23  Assuming that 
cooperation and collaboration are voluntary, organizations constantly evaluate whether or 
not they should continue to cooperate.  Of course, organizations make decisions 
regarding how they should behave or structure themselves based on their environment, 
making collaboration a dynamic process. 
Burton and Obel suggest a definite tie between organizational environment and 
resulting structure.  This theoretical link is applied to the TEW in later chapters.  As one 
of the principle parts of their theory, Burton and Obel note, “The environment-structure 
imperative indicates that an organization should design its structure in relation to its 
                                                 20 Ken G. Smith, Stephen Carroll and Susan Ashford, “Intra- and Interorganizational Cooperation:  
Toward a Research Agenda,” The Academy of Management Journal 38, No. 1 (Feb 95): 10. 
21 Pelfrey, 7. 
22 Kenneth Thomas.  Introduction to Conflict Management: Improving Performance Using the TKI 
(Palo Alto, CA:  CPP, Inc., 2002), 33-36. 
23 Pelfrey, 15. 
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environment.”24  They describe the environment in terms of four environmental 
characteristics:  equivocality, uncertainty, environmental complexity, and hostility.  For 
them, equivocality means confusion and lack of understanding, including confusion 
regarding the organization’s agenda and cause-effect relationships.  Uncertainty involves 
not knowing the value of an environmental variable related to the organization’s 
processes; for example, not knowing how many widgets to produce or the actual size or 
degree of the problem the organization is tasked to fix.  Complexity relates back to 
“wickedness” and the interrelatedness of problems.  Burton and Obel define it as the 
number of variables and their interdependency.  Hostility describes a situation where the 
organization’s environment threatens its performance or existence; a benign environment 
with low hostility supports the organization.25  Given these descriptors, Burton and 
Obel’s hypotheses regarding the effects of environmental factors are applied to the TEW 
as part of the collaboration analysis.  These four characteristics provide a framework for 
comparing the TEW’s environment during different stages of evolution. 
Viewed in this light, because environmental factors and the actions of 
organizations constantly change, collaboration becomes a dynamic process.  Hocevar, et 
al, proposes collaborative capacity as a dynamic measure of collaboration:  it is “the 
ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in 
pursuit of collective outcomes.”26  Researchers Bardach and Axelrod agree on the need 
for research on the dynamics and development of collaboration.  Thus, Axelrod notes: 
Further exploration of the evolution of cooperation can profit from the 
greater specification of the pattern of interactions and the process by 
which those interactions themselves evolve.  Research along such lines 
will not only help unite theoretical and empirical work even further than 
has so far been possible, but may also deepen our understanding of the 
initiation, maintenance, and further evolution of cooperation.27 
                                                 24 Richard Burton and Borge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design (Boston: Kluwer 
Publishers, 1998), 166. 
25 Burton and Obel, 165-189. 
26 Hocevar, et al. 
27 Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion, “The Further Evolution of Cooperation,” Science, New Series 
242, No. 4884 (9 Dec 88):  1389.  JSTOR; accessed 3 Nov 05. 
11 
Like theories of cooperation, collaboration research would certainly benefit from 
additional examination of the dynamic nature of collaborative processes over time. 
Thus, many methods of studying collaboration and inter-organizational behavior 
exist.  For example, one can reverse engineer a collaborative process to determine best 
practices.  Eugene Bardach describes an analytical approach that “finds an amazing 
gizmo, takes it apart, and tries to figure out the clever trick that makes it work so well.”  
Bardach highlighted not-so-magical interagency activities, including acquiring resources 
for collaboration, steering a course, and developing a culture of joint problem solving.28  
Like Bardach’s research, this study is an attempt to analyze the evolution of the TEW in 
order to find out how it formed as a collaborative network.  Thus, this research bridges 
the narrow divide between collaboration theory and networking and views organizations 
(the TEW in this case) as a source of collaborative processes.  Details regarding network 
theory and methods for analyzing network development are explained further in Chapter 
III. 
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III. NETWORK THEORY AND METHODOLOGY  
Interagency collaboration can be viewed as a process involving a network of 
organizations.  It follows that a descriptive analysis of the network’s evolution will shed 
light on the collaborative process.  This chapter reviews the applicability of network 
theory to explain problems of inter-organizational collaboration.  This section also 
introduces social network analysis methodology and investigative tools that are applied to 
the TEW. 
 
A. NETWORK THEORY APPLICATION TO COLLABORATION  
Barabasi contends that, “the enigma of the society starts with the convoluted 
structure of the social network,” and adds that “networks are the prerequisite for 
describing any complex system.”29  Jorg Raab echoes Barabasi’s point on the 
overarching applicability of networks and views them as a means of coordinating social 
activity.30  Given that, it follows that a network perspective on homeland security-related 
intergovernmental frameworks is appropriate, especially in situations where coordination 
is critical.  Kapucu argues that specifically in emergency response, the way in which 
networks are connected affects the abilities of the network to respond.   
Networks that have few or weak connections, or where some actors are 
connected only by pathways or great length may display slow response to 
stimuli.  Networks that have more and stronger connections with shorter 
paths among actors may be more robust and more able to respond quickly 
and effectively.31 
Thus, a combination of inter-organizational collaboration theory and networking theory 
may provide new insights into modern day problems that are not only complex, but 
“wicked” due to the fact that their solutions require extensive inter-organizational 
coordination.  In such cases, achieving an appropriate level of coordination itself 
becomes more difficult because no one organization is responsible for the entire problem.  
                                                 29 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked (London:  Penguin Books, 2003), 238. 
30 O’Toole, 45. 
31 Kapucu, 34-35. 
14 
In the case of many social, economic and environmental issues, there is also no definite 
solution (as in a mathematical problem, for example). 
Nohria lists several reasons why networks must be considered as part of 
organizational analysis.  Like Barabasi, he notes, “all organizations are in important 
respects social networks and need to be addressed and analyzed as such.”  Furthermore, 
he argues that organizations cannot be taken out of their networked environment: “An 
organization’s environment is properly seen as a network of other organizations.”  Within 
this ‘inter-organizational field’ or environment, Nohria says networks exist 
simultaneously as structures and actors themselves.  They “constrain actions, and in turn 
are shaped by them.”32  They are dynamic, changing entities, necessitating analytical 
perspectives that incorporate their constant evolution. 
In addition, Frederickson calls for network theory in situations where 
jurisdictional boundaries become fuzzy.  He notes, “the focus of network theorists on 
nonhierarchical and non-market cooperation is especially relevant to public 
administration responses to the changing context of our work and particularly on the 
disarticulation of the state.”33  In complex public policy arenas where collaboration 
occurs, where efforts and budgets are linked, networks become even more relevant.  
O’Toole notes that federal spending now tends toward collaborative, multi-agency 
programs, rather than single-agency programs.34  In practice, DHS approves requests for 
State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative grants to 
states and localities based in part on whether or not grant money supports interagency 
efforts.  Bureaucratic red tape, however, significantly slows the process of requesting, 
approving, and distributing funds.35  Organizations are thus faced not only with the cross-
jurisdictional and complex problem of terrorism itself, but also with challenges in 
acquiring resources to solve their problems. 
                                                 32 Nitin Nohria and Robert Eccles, eds., Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action 
(Boston: Harvard Press, 1992):  4-6. 
33 Frederickson, 705. 
34 O’Toole, 46. 
35 US GAO, “Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has Improved But 
Challenges Remain,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives 
(Washington:  GPO, Feb 05), 4-5. 
15 
DHS’ attempt to encourage interagency problem-solving via its grant approval 
process may hasten coordination to a certain degree.  However, if the lure of federal 
grants is not enough to force change, then perhaps organizational results can.  Kapucu 
concludes that hierarchical bureaucracies will become less important in the future and 
that “the organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical pyramids…they 
will be systems.”36  Of course, the networks making up those systems can be analyzed to 
determine how they function. 
 
B. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
Social network analysis (SNA) is not new.  It often is traced back to 
anthropologists who sought a methodology appropriate for the study of societal 
relationships.  Noted anthropologist Radcliff-Brown focused on a ‘web’ of social life, 
which eventually evolved to the term social ‘network.’37  Scholars seeking to explain 
interpersonal or inter-organizational behavior saw limitations in structural approaches 
that neglected social aspects.  Even before the emphasis on ‘social’ entered into network 
analysis, Freeman explains how network analysts sought to uncover patterns and then 
“determine the conditions under which those patterns arise and to discover their 
consequences.”38  Over the years, network analysis has been applied to numerous fields, 
from biology to economics.  Freeman applies SNA techniques to trace the evolution of 
SNA itself, and finds that no single path seems to exist for SNA; its theoretical 
progression seems more like a tangled social web.39   
What is clear is that SNA offers several methodological advantages over a pure 
structural approach to organizational analysis.  Barabasi offers a SNA metaphor.  
According to him, “networks have become the X-ray machines of our connectedness.”40   
 
                                                 36 Kapucu, 35-36. 
37 John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook,  2nd Ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 4. 
38 Linton Freeman, The Development of Social Network Analysis (Vancouver, BC: Empirical Press, 
2004). 
39 Freeman. 
40 Barabasi, 237. 
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Instead of focusing on one organization or one layer in a bureaucracy or organization, 
SNA enables a multi-level perspective—a more comprehensive perspective.  Marsden 
and Lin explain: 
The network orientation offers new approaches to describing and studying social 
structure and to dealing with complex problems of integrating levels of analysis: the 
manner in which individual actions create social structure; the manner in which 
social structure, once created, constrains individual and collective action; or the 
manner in which attitudes and behaviors of actors are determined by the social 
context in which action takes place.41 
Thus, SNA is a versatile analytical tool.  Although used as a macro perspective at times, 
SNA also can be used to disassemble networks and view them at a micro level. 
Despite the fact that SNA has developed greatly from its early anthropological 
roots, some scholarly niches remain relatively untouched.  Kanter notes that “most of the 
methods and concepts used by academics to study networks have a static, snapshot 
quality to them.  Their focus is largely on structural characteristics of the network being 
studied, with little attention paid to how these networks were constructed by them 
members and how these members are using them.”42  Barabasi emphasizes the 
dynamicism of networks when he states:  “Real networks are not static, as all graph 
theoretical models were until recently.  Instead, growth plays a key role in shaping their 
topology.”43  Nohria extends this line of reasoning further and argues that “networks are 
as much process as they are structure.”44  Consequently, studies of networks must 
recognize the evolving—almost living--nature of networks. 
In counterterrorism and emergency response, the “life” of the network depends on 
information flow to enable decision-making and action.  Problematic or effective network 
relationships affecting this process can be revealed via SNA.  Anthony Dekker explains 
that interpreting relations between people and/or groups in networks may uncover details 
abut information bottlenecks or critical tasks that have been unrecognized.  Most 
                                                 41 Peter Marsden and Nan Lin, Eds., Social Structure and Network Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1982), 10. 
42 Rosabeth Kanter and Robert Eccles, “Conclusion:  Making Network Research Relevant to Practice,” 
in Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action (Boston: Harvard Press, 1992), 526-527. 
43 Barabasi, 221. 
44 Nohria, 7. 
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importantly, he notes, SNA enables “recommendations to improve communication and 
workflow in an organization, and (in military terms) to speed up what is commonly 
known as the observe-orient-decide-act loop or decision cycle.”45  Although 
counterterrorism and emergency response organizations each have unique informational 
requirements, they share the need for efficient information flow to support decision-
making. 
Both public sector and military organizations realize the benefits of using non-
traditional, non-hierarchical structures at times in order to improve collaborative 
processes.  Numerous attempts at public sector inter-organizational collaboration exist at 
the national, state and local level; countless more exist in the private sector, where 
businesses also realize the utility in flattening their organizations and improving 
coordination mechanisms between groups.  It appears that an almost limitless number of 
potential network organizations could be studied using SNA. 
 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Several SNA techniques involve collection of quantitative data and application of 
mathematical modeling software to depict a social network.  However, given the limited 
scope of this study, a less rigorous, qualitative approach to studying the TEW was 
chosen.  The specific SNA method for this project draws upon techniques used by SNA 
scholars Nohria & Breiger.  Findings from the network perspective are fused in the final 
chapter in order to reveal implications for theories and practices of inter-organizational 
collaboration. 
Non-quantitative techniques remain effective tools for analyzing network 
structure.  Scott emphasizes that qualitative network descriptors remain very useful.  He 
states, “While it is, of course, possible to undertake quantitative and statistical counts of 
relations, network analysis consists of a body of qualitative measures of network 
structure.”46  Not surprisingly, the number of qualitative tools available for SNA is also 
                                                 45 Anthony Dekker, “Applying Social Network Analysis Concepts to Military C4ISR Architectures,”  
Connections 24, No. 3 (2002): 94.  Available at http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/Connections-Web/Volume24-
3/Dekker.web.pdf.  Internet; accessed 7 Oct 05. 
46 Scott, 3. 
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high.  However, because this study is admittedly not a definitive work, a select number of 
qualitative measures were chosen in an attempt to emulate, at least partially, the methods 
of Nohria and Breiger and describe the evolution of a collaborative network. 
Nohria used SNA to study the 128 Venture Group, a forum for people interested 
in high-technology ventures in the Route 128 region near Boston.  Nohria focused on a 
single organization and tracked participants and network development over time while 
noting changes in the organization’s environment.  In that case, those interested in high-
tech business ventures required access to timely information and needed a means to 
quickly coordinate efforts based on that information.  Efficient coordination enables 
products to make it to market and earn profits sooner.  Nohria found that the participants 
involved in the network at any given time changed frequently.  In his case, participants 
focused on “searching” for information and complimentary resources they could use.  He 
concluded that in many cases, “participants confront a dynamic problem in which a 
changing combination of technical, capital, management, and support-service resources 
are required at different stages of a venture’s development.”47  This same situation is 
likely to be true in homeland security, where different sets of actors constantly “search” 
information and mechanisms to collaborate, depending on the information, threat or 
event.  In describing the changing set of participants, he noted,  
…a disproportionately large number of the social ties created here are 
weak and therefore potentially bridging ties.  This is because a majority of 
the participants who attend each meeting are strangers to one 
another….The 128 Venture Group thus acts as a ‘weak-tie generator’ 
where participants with different affiliations within the network may 
create bridging ties with one another.48 
So, in studying participants in a growing network, it is useful to see if the network brings 
together already closely tied individuals or whether it creates new, weak links that 
facilitate otherwise impossible collaborative efforts. 
                                                 47 Nitin Nohria, “Information and Search in the Creation of New Business Ventures: The Case of the 
128 Venture Group,” in Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action (Boston: Harvard Press, 
1992), 240. 
48 Nohria, “Information and Search in the Creation of New Business Ventures: The Case of the 128 
Venture Group,” 257. 
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In addition, Nohria observed the results of meetings which he argued created a 
“cosmopolitan” outlook where the weak ties not only enabled existing collaborative 
efforts, but also created a potential for future joint efforts.   
An individual who has several weak ties is exposed to a wide variety of 
viewpoints and activities and develops cognitive flexibility and a 
cosmopolitan outlook….It permits one to assess a much wider range of 
options and hence be more effective in searching for complimentary 
resources.49 
This outlook seems similar to cultural aspects of collaborative capacity, where 
participants begin to see beyond their own needs and try to find ‘win-win’ solutions to 
the aggregate problem at hand. 
Nohria’s technique qualitatively tracks participation and growth of social 
networks while also considering environmental and cultural factors.  As a compliment to 
this, Breiger suggests actors in networks have individual characteristics but are also 
affected by larger group dynamics.  Those, in turn, affect the individual, making it 
virtually impossible to disconnect individual identity from the network.  Breiger uses this 
“duality of persons and groups” as part of his SNA method. 
Consider a metaphor which has appeared in sociological literature but has 
remained largely unexploited in empirical work.  Individuals come 
together (or, metaphorically, “intersect” one another) within groups, which 
are collectivities based on the shared interests, personal affinities, or 
ascribed status of members who participate regularly in collective 
activities. At the same time, the particular patterning of an individual’s 
affiliations (or the ‘intersection’ of groups within the person) defines his 
points of reference and determines (at least partially) his individuality.50 
Faust details Breiger’s duality further, explaining that “Linkages in an affiliation network 
occur between two different kinds of social entities, referred to as ‘actors’ and ‘events.”  
The duality here approximates Nohria’s notion that networks exist as both structures and 
actors; in action, they dynamically represent on-going interactive processes.  Faust 
continues: 
                                                 49 Nohria, “Information and Search in the Creation of New Business Ventures: The Case of the 128 
Venture Group,” 257. 
50 Ronald Breiger, “The Duality of Persons and Groups.” Social Forces 53, No. 2 (Dec 74): 181. 
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Viewed from the perspective of actors, participation in events links actors 
to one another.  Viewed from the dual perspective of events, the actors’ 
multiple memberships link events together.  Putting these together gives a 
joint perspective of the simultaneous linking of actors through events and 
though actors.51 
Therefore, this technique enables the study of network development over time, rather 
than focusing on a single event. 
The concept of duality extends Granovetter’s argument on the importance of 
weak ties.  Where “an individual’s ties are redundant with those of others,” group 
centrality is said to be high, and strong ties exist52  This concept can be used to support 
affiliation SNA via the use of two-mode data from actors, events and resulting 
relationships where it is argued that “two actors participating in the same event indicates 
the existence or potential for some form of social bond between them.”53  This technique 
focuses on the extent to which events create bridges between different parts of the 
network; it shows the evolution of the network as it incorporates more interests, 
perspectives and broader collaboration from additional, diverse groups. 
In essence, the SNA method used here hybridizes Nohria and Breiger’s methods.  
TEW actors and events are qualitatively detailed over time, from pre-TEW to the present, 
while also noting significant environmental changes that impact the network.  The next 
chapter seeks to determine exactly how the TEW evolved from a small group of actors to 
a diverse, county-wide network bridging public-private, local-state-federal, and 
functional divides.  Following that, this fused SNA perspective will be cross-fed into 
collaboration theory to enable further discussion of inter-organizational processes and 
final conclusions in Chapter V. 
                                                 51 Katherine Faust, “Using Correspondence Analysis for Joint Displays of Affiliation Networks,” in 
Carrington, Scott & Wasserman, Eds., Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 119. 
52 Martin Everett & Stephen Borgatti, “Extending Centrality,” in Carrington, Scott & Wasserman, Eds., 
Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 58. 
53 Everett, 63. 
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IV. LOS ANGELES TEW NETWORK EVOLUTION  
Los Angeles’s recent experiences in emergency response coordination include 
anti-terrorism support for the 1984 Summer Olympics and 2000 Democratic National 
Convention as well as responses to the 1992 riots, 1994 Northridge earthquake, 1998 
anthrax scares, and post-9/11 incidents.  Regarding these efforts, LA City 
Councilmember Jack Weiss noted LA’s emergency response procedures are developed 
“more thoroughly than many other local governments.”54  Had these events not occurred, 
however, the geographic size, population and diversity of LA County still mean that 
cross-jurisdictional and cross-functional collaboration is necessary to plan for the 
emergency needs of the county’s 88 cities and 10 million residents.  In terms of 
counterterrorism, these influential historical events and local requirements shape the 
TEW’s evolution as a collaborative network.  In addition to the external events and 
environmental requirements, however, several self-initiated TEW actions also impact the 
network’s development.  This chapter examines evolution of the TEW and its 
collaboration, from its early foundations to its more formal organization and continuing 
outreach efforts.55 
 
A. TEW OVERVIEW  
One of the main architects behind the TEW, LA Sheriff Department Lieutenant 
John P. Sullivan, describes it as “a multilateral, multidisciplinary effort to monitor open 
source data to identify trends and potential threats, monitor specific threat information 
during periods of heightened concern, assess potential targets, and perform net 
assessments to guide decision-making during actual events.”56  The TEW facilitates 
                                                 54 Jack Weiss, “Preparing Los Angeles for Terrorism:  A Ten Point Plan,” Oct 02:  4.  Available at 
http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/nonprof/nps08-091504-49.pdf.  NPS Homeland Security 
Digital Library; accessed 8 Nov 05. 
55 For a more detailed description of TEW structure and function, see Michael Grossman, Perception 
or Fact: Measuring the Performance of the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group (Monterey:  Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005). 
56 John P. Sullivan, “The Local Need for Intelligence and Warning,” RAND Conference Proceedings, 
Bioterrorism:  Home Land Defense Conference, Pre-Attack Panel, 8 Feb 00: 1.  Available at 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/bioterr/agenda1.html#2.  Internet; accessed 5 Nov 05. 
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emergency response in support of the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC).  The Sheriff is the secretariat for the TEW, but does not officially take charge or 




Figure 1.   TEW Net Assessment Organization57 
 
Prior to the existence of the TEW, California’s Standardized Emergency Management 
System (SEMS) set up a framework for response to a variety of natural and man-made 
disasters.  Although not specifically tailored to meet the terrorism threat, this framework 
links many of the actors involved in counterterrorism due to their shared responsibilities 
in generic emergency response, as per SEMS requirements.  Under this system, mutual 
aid agreements mean that local jurisdictions can request assistance from other 
                                                 57 James P. Sullivan, “Networked All-Source Fusion for Intelligence and Law Enforcement Counter-
terrorism Response,” Conference Paper presented to “Integrating Intelligence and Law Enforcement for 
Homeland Security,” Intelligence Studies Section of the 2004 ISA Annual Convention, Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada, 18 Mar 04, 7. 
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jurisdictions if response requirements exceed local capabilities.  So, based on pre-
existing, non-terrorism specific procedural arrangements, some of the same inter-
organizational relationships capitalized upon by the TEW already existed within the 
SEMS (e.g., local police and fire departments agreements to augment each other in crisis 
situations). 
In fact, California’s emergency management system already had designated LA 
County as a unified Operational Area—a jurisdictional delineation that the TEW 
continued as well.  In each county, the Sheriff acts as the default director of emergency 
operations “crosscutting public works, public health, public safety, and resource 
coordination.”58  The county EOC houses offices for representatives from several 
different county functional departments, including the Sheriff, Fire, Public Works, 
Internal Services, Health Services, Public Social Services, Coroner, and Human 
Resources Departments.  The county’s individual cities also are linked directly to the 
EOC.  At times, military liaisons and other special representatives also are called.  
Overall, the departments represented at the EOC set up a generic emergency and disaster 
response capability, which is not necessarily integrated to maximize terrorism readiness.  
Mostly, the presence of these organizations in the EOC enables representatives to 
coordinate with their own organization’s hierarchy.59 
Thus, at first glance, it seems the TEW simply added previously missing counter- 
and anti-terrorism information needed to enable the state SEMS to respond to terrorist 
threats, potentials, and events. 60  However, terrorism-specific information was not the 
only missing link in an otherwise perfect SEMS.  In determining how the TEW 
collaborative network evolved, the unique inter-organizational relationships that 
developed as part of the organization’s maturation are used to demonstrate the added 
value of the TEW in linking otherwise disparate actors in a continuous process to ensure 
readiness for terrorist events. 
                                                 58 Sullivan, “The Local Need for Intelligence and Warning,” 1-2. 
59 James P. Sullivan, interview with author, 30 Sep 05. 
60 Michael Grossman, “Comparative Government,” Lecture presented at Naval Postgraduate School, 
30 Jan 06. 
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LA’s counterterrorism preparedness came to the fore prior to the 1984 Summer 
Olympics in Los Angeles and eventually led to the formation of the Los Angeles Task 
Force on Terrorism (LATFOT).  According to its founding Memorandum of Agreement, 
the FBI functions as the lead agency in the LATFOT and unites the Los Angeles Police 
Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.  The agreement kept the FBI 
in charge of terrorism investigative efforts while acknowledging the need for local 
interagency collaboration.61  This arrangement represented an early version of the FBI’s 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) concept.62 
Non-terrorist events drew attention to emergency response as well.  Criticism of 
public response to the LA riots and Northridge earthquake encouraged reassessment of 
disaster preparedness and the interagency processes involved.  In 1996, threats to attack 
the US and Americans in Osama Bin Ladin’s fatwa also hastened TEW collaborative 
efforts.  Then Deputy John P. Sullivan and Deputy Larry Richards took notice of Bin 
Ladin’s escalatory rhetoric and concluded that “the only way to deal with a terrorist 
network was to create a counter-terrorism network and that information sharing among 
agencies would be the key to preventing and reacting to terrorist attacks.  LA County’s 
Terrorism Early Warning group was born.”63  The operational intelligence-oriented TEW 
and policy advisory-oriented Terrorism Working Group (TWG) both formed in 1996.  
The inter-agency TWG met monthly to develop terrorism-related plans, procedures and 
systems.  As a compliment, the TEW’s intelligence capabilities provide policy context for 
TWG decisions. Additionally, “They provide periodic intelligence estimates and white 
papers which are derived from open source information. They also develop warnings 
based on criminal intelligence and investigations.”64 
The “intelligence” effort fused law enforcement and open source threat 
information; at that time, the system did not include what is commonly thought of as 
                                                 61 Daryl Gates, “The Los Angeles Barrier Against Terrorism,” Police Chief 26, No. 3 (Mar 89): 63. 
62 Grossman Lecture, 30 Jan 06. 
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“traditional intelligence” from US intelligence agencies.  By using its investigative 
liaison cell, the TEW used the LATFOT to link LA County and city fire departments, 
Department of Health Services and state office of Emergency Services into the LATFOT.  
Although the LATFOT remained focused on law enforcement, inclusion of the cross-
functional TEW meant that terrorism was no longer viewed as purely a law enforcement 
issue requiring only the FBI and Police and Sheriff Departments. 
The TEW held its first meeting in October 1996.  Representatives from the Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, the law enforcement 
branch of California’s Office of Emergency Services, and several academic and research 
institutions attended the initial gathering.  What is important to note in this initial 
gathering is that the TEW—from the beginning—sought external experts to assist in their 
process development.  There seemed to be an open recognition among participants of the 
fact that the terrorist threat had now changed to the extent that many, many more 
organizations must be included in efforts to deal with this “wicked” problem.  The TEW 
network quickly expanded with the addition of “fire service, public health, public works, 
and neighboring law enforcement agencies” representatives at the TEW’s second meeting 
in November 1996.65  During these initial meetings, inter-organizational divides 
remained obvious.  Sergeant Sullivan noted that at one of the early meetings, “we started 
to discuss security measures and a law enforcement official said, ‘Wait a minute. We 
can’t discuss this in front of the Fire Department.’”  Sullivan and Richards responded 
“Yes, we can. That’s why we’re here.”66 
At first, TEW monthly meetings aimed to enable the participating organizations to 
share threat information.  However, the network soon became more than just an informal 
“sounding board.” The members began producing formalized target folders with 
information on assessed threat potentials at specific locations thought to be potential 
targets and recommended responses.  They also started compiling playbooks detailing 
how to respond to specific threats, including chemical and biological events.67  These 
                                                 65 Pilant, 34038. 
66 Greg Krikorian, “Terrorism Early Warning Group Works to keep LA’s Guard up,” LA Times, 7 Nov 
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playbooks are put to the test during training exercises run in conjunction with monthly 
TEW meetings.  Early meetings also involved discussion of how to combine information 
from participating organizations as part of a collaborative analysis and assessment 
process—the beginnings of the current TEW assessment process.68 
The TEW’s pre-planning paid off in 1998 when a string of anthrax threats were 
issued in the Los Angeles area.  During the summer, the TEW had released an 
Emergency Preparedness Bulletin, and in December 1998 the TEW published a policy 
advisory on response to weapons of mass destruction and anthrax.  Just five days after the 
release of that document, four threats of anthrax were reported in greater metropolitan 
Los Angeles.  Police, fire, emergency medical services, HAZMAT, FBI, the County of 
Los Angeles Department of Health Services, the California Department of Health 
Services, and Centers for Disease Control responded to the incidents with the Sheriff’s 
Department providing oversight for the effort as per Emergency Management System 
guidelines.69  The anthrax “attacks” were later determined to be hoaxes, but were quickly 
followed by exercises enabling the TEW to test existing processes and linkages while 
also revealing potential areas where the network needed to be expanded.  TEW training 
taught first responders how to assess and respond to threats, how to verify hoaxes and 
when to halt evacuations.70  This training was put to the test during the TEW’s first field 
test in 1999.  During the Westwind chemical-biological exercise, the TEW provided 
assessments to local, state, federal and military first responders. 
At the same time, the TEW launched a major support effort in preparation for the 
Democratic National Convention, which was held in Los Angeles in August 2000.  The 
TEW, along with a myriad of local, state, and federal agencies, including the US Secret 
Service, FBI, Sheriff, police, Highway Patrol and fire organizations all prepared for the 
possibility of demonstrations and threats.  The TEW followed its now well-honed 
procedures for the event.  TEW cells fused tactical information into strategic assessments  
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and briefings which were provided to other involved organizations.  In a study analyzing 
TEW performance during this event, Commander Grossman from the LA Sheriff’s 
Department concluded: 
During this short period the TEW demonstrated its capability to integrate field 
intelligence from multiple sources to form an overall countywide picture. It 
provided an intelligence fusion system that integrated criminal and operational 
intelligence with emergency management practices across jurisdictional lines.71 
The event enabled the TEW to further strengthen its intelligence analysis and information 
sharing procedures and relationships from local to state and federal levels. 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the TEW remained at the forefront 
of LA County’s terrorism readiness efforts.  Chemical-biological response requirements 
and inter-organizational relationships continued to develop as LA officials witnessed 
nationwide 9/11 response efforts and anthrax investigations.  Since 9/11, Operation 
Talavera, Determined Promise 2004 and Operation Chimera response exercises tested 
local, state and federal bioterrorism incident response capabilities in LA.  The 
relationships forged during these practices became formalized in a recently signed 
Memorandum of Understanding between the key agencies involved in chemical-
biological response—LA County Public Health, FBI and the LA Sheriff’s Department.72 
Looking overall at the TEW’s performance in this brief historical review, it is 
clear that the organization integrated numerous organizations into a rather successful 
network.  In order to appreciate how the network evolved, however, a closer look at its 
use of flexible and scalable relationships is needed. 
 
B. SNA OF PAST AND PRESENT TEW  
The drive to integrate organizationally in response to increasingly networked 
adversaries shaped TEW design as a collaborative network.  From the beginning, built-in 
organizational flexibility was a priority.  Sullivan describes the TEW as having a kind of 
selective outreach capability, where network response is tailored to situational needs: 
                                                 71 Grossman, Perception or Fact: Measuring the Performance of the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) 
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accessed 20 Dec 05. 
28 
We can plug in modules of what we need.  If we need a biological 
response, we incorporate the public health community.  If we need a 
chemical response, we incorporate the hazmat community.  If we have a 
conventional bomb response, we bring in the appropriate people; if it’s a 
cyber response, we reach out to cyber specialists.73  
Instead of activating the entire network, as might occur in hierarchical organizations, the 
TEW efficiently pulses only requisite portions of the network.   
Since its inception, TEW network nodes have dramatically increased in number.  
Initially, network nodes represented organizations participating in TEW meetings, and 
some communication and coordination may have remained within organizational, 
geographical or functional nodes, despite the existence of the “network.”  With the 
TEW’s cross-functional elements, which place representatives from multiple 
organizations in the same section, new and stronger cross-functional and inter-
organizational ties have formed.   
According to Sullivan and Bunker, Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s strategy of 
counternetwar influenced the TEW network model.74  As per that strategy, each part of 
the TEW network has the capability to prevent and respond and can remain engaged—
and useful--during all phases of operations.  In essence,  
…each TEW node can perform dynamic assessment, cutting across 
‘stovepipes’ to configure an adaptive assessment organization that 
incorporates the internal (intra-node) and external (across nodes) elements 
necessary to identify specific threats, trends and potentials.  Configuring 
each node—and ultimately the entire network—to have permeable 
boundaries that expand capability when needed and exploit distributed 
subject matter expertise (exploiting the skills and capabilities of other 
nodes and clusters) to solve a specific problem, allows the network to 
become agile and adaptive.75  
The scalability of this network approach means that network relations continually change 
as different groups of organizations become linked via TEW operations.  The question 
                                                 73 Sullivan, “The Local Need for Intelligence and Warning,” 3. 
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remains, how did network links evolve?  In this section, network changes will be used to 
draw conclusions about overall TEW network patterns. 
 
1. Building on the SEMS Structure  
The early TEW network capitalized upon the existing Emergency Management 
System and the LA County Emergency Operations Center.  In other words, the TEW 
network focused on a specific problem (terrorism) using some pre-existing links.  Long-
standing local processes place the Sheriff in the center of a network linking several 
county departments (Fire, Public Works, Internal Services, Health Services, Public Social 
Services, Coroner, and Human Resources).  The EOC facilitates coordination between 
organizations, but for the most part each organizational or functional “stovepipe” works 
its own issues in a hierarchical, bureaucratic fashion.  The EOC brings together some of 
the right pieces for coordination, but does not put them together in a manner which 
maximizes analytical and assessment capabilities for terrorism.  Individual organizations 
remain functionally and geographically parsed, rather than integrated for collaborative 
assessment and action.   
Although the LATFOT offered the potential for some inter-organizational 
collaboration, LATFOT processes remained somewhat stove-piped.  LATFOT did not 
incorporate non-law enforcement entities into the network responsible for assessing 
terrorism threats.  This is in line with most pre-9/11 counterterrorism thinking:  terrorism 
was viewed as a law enforcement issue, rather than a national security issue directly 
involving a broader range of organizations. 
Comparing the organizations represented at the TEW’s first two meetings, it 
seems the TEW pulled representatives from already participating SEMS organizations.  
The way in which the TEW put those organizations together, however, marked a 
significant departure from that structure.  In particular, representatives from multiple 
departments worked together in each TEW cell; they were no longer segregated by 
organization.  Although each TEW cell had a specific function, representatives from 
multiple departments and functionalities were represented in each.  Thus, TEW 
assessments and recommendations were truly the product of a collaborative process, 
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where multiple organizations have inputs at each stage of investigation and analysis.  For 
example, public health questions were farmed out for resolution by public health 
representatives assigned to the TEW, leaving less room for error in translation.  Having 
received answers from the public health field, a TEW public health representative then 
framed the received information more specifically for the TEW and its counterterrorism-
specific needs. 
Also of significance is the fact that the TEW facilitated input from outside 
scholars and experts during its early meetings.  Sullivan and Richards knew where they 
wanted to go, but openly acknowledged a need for additional, expert guidance to make 
their vision reality. 
We’ve incorporated, right from the first meeting, outside subject matter 
experts to keep us from getting tunnel vision.  We brought in Dr. Robert 
Bunker from Cal State, San Bernardino.  And we brought in Maury 
Eisenstein from RAND Corporation.  We actively solicited participation 
from Los Alamos National Lab, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National 
Labs, and Battelle Memorial Institute, to make sure we didn’t miss 
something, to make sure we didn’t just look at the terrorist threat from our 
traditional paradigm.76 
TEW membership and processes were vague at the start, but there was agreement on the 
need to work together on terrorism issues.  Over time, it became clear that the TEW was 
not going to be doing business as usual. 
 
2. Developing New Processes  
Opinions from outside experts combined with the ideas of those involved to create 
an entirely new type of intelligence fusion and collaborative terrorism assessment 
process—intelligence preparation for operations (IPO), which aims to achieve not just 
situational awareness, but all-source situational understanding. 
Intelligence preparation for operations is emerging as a civil analog to the 
military intelligence preparation of the battlefield to serve response 
information needs.  IPO provides a standard tool set for situational 
recognition, course-of-action development, and response rehearsal.  This 
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process bridges the gap between deliberate planning and crisis action 
planning for all facets of a unified multi-organizational response 
organization.77 
This process, developed via consultation with civil, military and private sector experts 
brought LA County’s terrorism support processes to the cutting edge of warfare theory.  
The underlying principles of this process had been discussed for years, even before the 




Figure 2.   Intelligence Preparation for Operations (IPO)78  
 
The TEW process adapts and fuses parts of several existing military and civilian 
cycles, including the intelligence cycle, targeting cycle, targeting & collection 
management cycles, tasking cycle, OODA loop, and intelligence preparation of the 
battlespace (IPB).  The analysis and synthesis (depicted as A/S above) function integrates 
the IPO cycle.  The cylinder shown on the diagram is meant to show that the cycle occurs 
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at multiple levels, integrating numerous functions at the same time over the entire course 
of an event (event horizon).  The process is not intended to be simply a circular cycle.  Of 
note, there are five cells plus an OIC in the TEW.  These five cells are not specifically 
tied to the four steps in IPO the process, but do support it.  The IPO steps are:  Define the 
Operations Space (OPSpace), Describe OPSpace Effects, Evaluate Opposing Force 
(OPFOR) & Threats, and Determine OPFOR & Friendly Courses of Action (COAs).  
These four activities remain in a state of virtually constant execution; there is no ‘down 
time’ while the other steps are executed.  The process integrates concepts of fourth-
generation warfare where targets and infrastructure are evaluated on several levels--from 
geo-social to more traditional terrain and population standpoints.  There is also an 
intentional focus on swarming/counter-swarming strategy and deception.  The IPO 
process’ fusion of strategic and theoretical schools of thought makes it truly unique.79   
Similar to the way in which the TEW organizational concept builds upon net-
centric warfare principles in terms of its interagency relations, the IPO process applies 
fourth generation warfare concepts to intelligence analysis.  IPO expands upon traditional 
consequence management, conventional IPB and urban IPB.  Instead of a cyclical process 
of analysis, where analysis is seen as a sequential process, IPO applies networking 
principles to the analysis process to create a closely linked process whereby analytical 
assessments are the result of a web of collaboration which blurs the line between 
operations and intelligence.80  Instead of linear interactions, where intelligence 
requirements and assessments are passed back and forth between operations and 
intelligence units, IPO recognizes the non-linear nature of intelligence and existence of 
“complex interactions” where  
there are branching paths, feedback loops, jumps from one linear sequence 
to another….connections are not only adjacent, serial ones, but can 
multiply as other parts or units or subsystems are reached.81 
Within this framework, IPO supports a subsystem (TEW) of a larger system (EOC)—a 
marked departure from hierarchical organization and linear process approaches. 
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Along with the theory behind the IPO process, the TEW is in the process of 
developing training and documentation to support their vision.  The TEW already has 
participated in numerous exercises and continues documenting and revising its tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) based on those experiences.  The TEW’s formalized 
“network protocols” capture many of the details on how collaboration actually occurs 
within the network.  These “protocols” were named as such to avoid confusion with non-
network rules or formal tasking requirements, maintain cooperative attitudes and reduce 
organizational resistance.82  Documentation of the processes, as currently understood, 
however, is a critical step in institutionalizing the network’s mission and goals.  Without 
official documentation of the creative analytical processes, the innovative work of the 
TEW’s pioneering leaders could easily be lost after just a few personnel changes.83 
Overall, the TEW’s IPO process takes combined OODA / IPB loop concept and 
turns it into a networked process where assessments are instantaneous yet at the same 
time constantly being updated.  The process takes into account possible sources of 
information and assesses it from diverse perspectives to generate usable, fused 
assessments which are the product of a truly collaborative process.  As a compliment to 
theoretical process improvements, technical advances have facilitated communications 
improvements within the TEW and EOC.  These communications technologies have, in 
some cases, enabled more efficient dissemination of information in support of the IPO 
process.84 
 
3. Extending the Network  
The TEW did not stop at process improvements; its members realized that in 
order to make their IPO vision truly net-centric, they had to extend their network further.  
They knew they had to coordinate from the start and dove head-first into their 
collaborative process with just a few of the pieces in place.  In essence, TEW set out on a 
“collaborate first, ask questions later” approach where participating organizations decided 
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to work together on analysis, even before funding and manning issues were resolved.  At 
the beginning, TEW work began as an additional, unofficial task for most of the 
participants.  Until recently, when organizations sent representatives to work TEW issues, 
those personnel were not replaced.  This meant that for some organizations, committing 
personnel to counterterrorism has been at the expense of other tasks.85  
Despite personnel challenges, the LA County network of first responder 
organizations expanded further.  Orange County Sheriff Carona and LA County Sheriff 
Baca took note of an established South Bay area of Los Angeles County liaison program, 
which linked Sheriffs and police for information sharing and mutual aid support.  By the 
end of 2002, they had officially expanded this program, adding fire and health agencies 
and extending it throughout the county as the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) 
program.86  This effort strengthened official links and information flow between county 
and city organizations.  Although local first responder organizations had functional, 
hierarchical ties to the county via their traditional hierarchical chain or command, the 
TLO program enabled direct non-stove piped communication from local organizations to 
the TEW and EOC.87 
At the same time, TEW expansion continued on a separate front as more 
representatives from more organizations and more types of organizations were invited 
into the fold.  TEW participants realized that although some of LA County’s 
infrastructure was publicly owned, many of the critical infrastructure sites important to 
emergency response were privately owned.  So, infrastructure liaison officers (ILOs) 
were invited to work with the TEW in order to ensure readiness for their companies’ 
university, utility, commerce or industry site.  The reciprocal, albeit voluntary, 
relationships in the ILO program allowed information and training to be disseminated to 
organizations represented by the ILOs; additionally, concerns and vulnerabilities reported 
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by ILOs provided further impetus for TEW readiness planning and assessments.  Finally, 
many of the companies have assets which may be useful in the event of a terrorist attack, 
so they are an important source for potential emergency resources.  Private interest in the 
program was high and spread via word of mouth and unofficial channels; organizations 
joined as they noticed other companies doing so; it seemed no one wanted to be seen as 
passing up an opportunity to improve their organization’s terrorism readiness.88 
 
4. External Links to LA’s TEW  
The LA TEW maintains links with other TEWs as well as organizations at the 
state, federal and international levels.  These external links compliment the 
communication and information flow available via the EOC.  This “over-the-horizon” 
perspective keeps LA’s TEW strategically, tactically and theoretically aware of 
terrorism-specific issues as well as inter-organizational innovations which may become 
relevant in LA. 
In addition to the TEW and TWG, LA County joined with neighboring Orange 
County to develop a Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) that worked, like the 
TEW’s TLO and ILO programs, to link public and private sector terrorism efforts.  This 
policy initiative also provided another avenue for input by outside experts during the 
HSAC’s bimonthly meetings.  Orange County Assistant Sheriff Jaramillo describes the 
HSAC’s goal “to provide direct interaction among senior executives from industry and 
the community with law enforcement and public safety services in support of Homeland 
Security, civil protection, and critical infrastructure protection,” thus creating a “bridge 
for the business community to have a direct contact with subject matter experts for 
counsel and advice in support of planning, training, and activation.”89  The extension of 
LA TEW existing links out into the private sector via the HSAC increases the TEW’s 
potential effectiveness by increasing its pool of available information and resources.  
Although the HSAC functions in more of an advisory capacity and does not process 
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intelligence information, its links to the TEW make it useful as part of the TEW’s 
scalable network.  It also provides another outlet for TEW products to impact local 
decision-making and readiness. 
Within the region, the TEW also works with other TEWs.  TEW-to-TEW links 
between the Orange and LA County TEWs may not be as “strong” as those within the LA 
TEW itself; however, because the TEWs share many of the same processes and 
theoretical outlooks, the TEW expansion to a certain degree expands the strong network 
core and, perhaps, its corresponding ability to support an increased number of weak 
external links.  Stronger connections at the TEW-TEW level, in addition to the already 
strong local connections increase the TEW’s ability to respond effectively.90  Jaramillo 
describes the close relationship between the two nearly identical organizations and how it 
has spurred additional TEW-to-TEW links. 
These units converse on a daily basis sharing information and intelligence.  
Members of these teams regularly attend training seminars, exercises, and 
conventions together.  As a result of the efforts of the effectiveness of the 
Terrorism Early Warning Group, agencies from California, Washington, 
Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, and Nebraska have formed TEWG’s.  The 
information sharing and dissemination at a local level continues to grow.  
Monthly conference calls have been established with several southland 
agencies where information is shared regarding terrorism issues.91 
Although not all TEW’s are identical—and may not need to be, based on local 
requirements, they generally seek to apply integrative (non-stove piped) inter-
organizational collaboration techniques and processes in support of counterterrorism and 
homeland security programs.  Their varying levels of development, along with the fact 
that the LA TEW itself is not done evolving, mean that TEW evolution overall will likely 
to continue for some time. 
At the state level, the TEW works closely with several organizations.  The 
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services administers the SEMS and EOC architecture 
that the TEW supports.  The TEW works closely with the State Department of Justice 
and, since the establishment of the California Governor’s Office of Homeland Security in 
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2003, it has been working with additional, newly formed state organizations, including 
the California Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (RTTAC).  In addition to 
the State RTTAC, four regional RTTACs were created to align with existing FBI regions 
and JTTFs.  The RTTAC structure provides a terrorism-specific focus to the links 
established within the emergency management system.92  It mirrors many of the EOC 
links at the state level, focusing on information sharing: 
The STTAC coordinates the ongoing information sharing and prevention 
efforts of State agencies, including the Office of Homeland Security, 
California Department of Justice, California Highway Patrol, Office of 
Emergency Services, Emergency Medical Services Authority, California 
Department of Food and Agriculture, and other State agencies.93 
The RTTAC structure also supports a state-wide TLO program, which builds upon the 
TLO network started by the LA TEW. 
Beyond the state level, the TEW maintains ties to the Department of Homeland 
Security and FBI (via TEW investigative liaison cell coordination with the JTTF).  Based 
on the existence of critical infrastructure targets in LA County and experiences from the 
Olympic Games and DNC, the TEW also maintains links to the Coast Guard, Secret 
Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.  The LA TEW extended its 
network further by working directly with diplomatic, counterterrorism, and law 
enforcement organizations.  It has coordinated with local representatives from France, 
Canada, and Sweden, and has sent representatives to visit Israel, Pakistan, Jordan, and the 
UK.  This direct local-to-international coordination exemplifies the non-hierarchical, 
network nature of TEW collaboration and coordination.  The TEW pulls as needed from 
its network of resources, no matter the level or nationality of the organization.94 
At varying levels, TEW links bind public-private, military-civil, law enforcement-
intelligence, and terrorism-emergency response networks.  In 2005, LA County Sheriff 
Baca enabled an additional avenue for community outreach when he created the Muslim 
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American Homeland Security Congress.  The program aims to educate both Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities in an effort to discourage extremism within the Muslim 
community and hatred or discriminatory attitudes by the non-Muslim community against 
Muslims.  The creation of this organization offers a resource for information on the 
Muslim community.  The Muslim American Homeland Security Congress does not 
function in an intelligence capacity, but provides an avenue for clarification of Muslim 
issues.95 
 
5. Joint Regional Intelligence Center Participation  
TEW members occupy several cramped office spaces within the LA County EOC.  
The spartan office arrangement nevertheless sustains a cadre of dedicated TEW analysts.  
The mere fact that under this arrangement, TEW representatives from various 
organizations work in the same building on shared terrorism issues, however, represents a 
major step forward.  During EOC activation, this arrangement also allows TEW members 
to maintain ties to their respective parent organizations, who might have additional 
representatives assigned to the EOC working non-TEW tasks.96 
Later in 2006, the TEW is projected to gain some additional office space in a 
planned Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) in Norwalk, CA.  The Center is a joint 
effort between the California State Department of Justice, US Attorney’s Office, LA 
County Sheriff’s Department, FBI, and LA Police Department and will allow 
representatives from federal, state and local agencies to be collocated in a shared joint 
fusion center facility.  The Center will serve as a clearinghouse for terrorist-related leads 
and intelligence. The JRIC’s perspective goes beyond LA County and covers Orange, 
Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo.  With 
representatives from those counties as well as state and federal agencies present, the JRIC 
will enable joint analysis and investigation of terrorist-related threats and activities. 
In addition to access to some modern office space in the JRIC, the TEW will 
receive improved communications technology support enabling better information 
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sharing with other regional TEWs and Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers 
(RTTACs) in San Diego, San Francisco, Sacramento, as well as the California state 
RTTAC.97  By partnering a diverse pool of local, state and federal agencies in a 24/7 
operation, the JRIC offers the potential to significantly improve the quality of 
counterterrorism information.  If the stated objectives for the center become reality, 
combined information and analysis from various organizations may produce predictive 
assessments regarding terrorism threats that were otherwise impossible by individual 
agencies.  TEW representatives will still man their EOC facility, however, since their 
main responsibilities are to the EOC and EMS, especially during crisis situations.  If 
additional manning enables 24/7 TEW manning at both facilities, the potential for 
collaborative analysis could increase, as well.98 
In many ways, the JRIC initiative demonstrates just how far interagency 
collaboration has come since the LATFOT launched 20 years ago.  LATFOT 
representatives recognized the importance of fused information to counter terrorist threats 
that transcend local, jurisdictional boundaries.  In fact, the Memorandum of Agreement 
that formed the LATFOT acknowledged the value of combining the street knowledge of 
local agencies with the informational and investigative resources of other state and 
federal organizations.99  That same perspective is now theoretically operationalized via 
the projected assignment of personnel from multiple organizations to work in a joint 
terrorism center.  However, JRIC analytical processes must take advantage of the 
combined inputs its interagency participants submit in order to have a real impact.  If not, 
the JRIC may simply provide a new facility for business as usual--law-enforcement 
focused analysis--instead of capitalizing on the TEW all-source, fused intelligence and 
analysis processes. 
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V. FINDINGS  
This chapter links the case specific experiences of the TEW back to the theories 
presented in Chapters I and II in order to explain how the TEW network evolved.  When 
comparing the TEW experience to the literature on collaboration and networks, the case 
appears to be a textbook example of many of the theoretical concepts.  The TEW case 
demonstrates the true difficulty of creating and sustaining successful interagency 
collaboration efforts.  In terms of its evolution, the TEW smartly paced its growth as a 
network.  Despite its strategic outlook, expansive, all-source reach that extends the TEW 
network far beyond the borders of LA County, the network remains focused on its LA-
specific mission requirements. 
 
A. DRIVEN BY CIRCUMSTANCE TO COLLABORATE  
Within LA County, the sheer number of functional and geographic agencies at 
varying levels of government created the need for a robust structure to coordinate 
emergency response for the growing number of LA County residents.  In the case of 
terrorism, where the problem and solution require coordinated action by interdependent 
agencies, organizations may theoretically choose varying levels of cooperation.  
Realistically, several factors facilitated the TEW drive toward collaboration. 
Even in non-terrorism emergency response and planning, LA County first 
responder organizations met many of the conditions mentioned by in organizational 
theory literature as supporting coordination, cooperation, or collaboration.  Axelrod’s 
condition that organizations perceive continued long-term contact is certainly met; LA 
first responders know from recent first-hand experiences (LA riots, Northridge 
earthquake, etc.) that coordinated response is necessary.  No agency wants to appear 
unwilling to cooperate or coordinate in emergency situations.  However, perhaps because 
of criticism in these recent cases, LA’s organizations not only want to work together; 
they realize they must work together from planning to execution in order to achieve win-
win solutions. 
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Bardach’s delineation of collaborative acts as either preparatory or non-
preparatory provides additional clarification in the LA case.  During crisis, LA County’s 
organizations are expected to spring into seemingly coordinated, collaborative action.  
According to Bardach, this type of action is possible because of painstaking preparatory 
collaboration; the fact that preparations are made for such collaboration is required for 
“readiness,” making planning an intrinsically valuable part of emergency response:   
In emergency services, for instance, the understandings whereby 
neighboring fire departments would render mutual aid are of value every 
day that they are not invoked, whereas the acts of mutual aid are of value 
only on the day in ten or twenty years when conditions require them.…To 
generalize from these examples, it is the potential to engage in 
collaborative activities rather than the activities themselves that is what we 
really care about when we talk of interagency collaboration.100 
Even if emergency response processes are not called into action, the fact that they are 
available and ready is important.  So in the case of emergency response, collaborative 
capacity may be just as important as collaborative action.  Either way, collaboration—
working toward shared objectives—is expected. 
This study did not look extensively at organizational structure, except to say that 
in general, among the numerous organizations involved in LA County’s terrorism 
planning and response, some type of cross-functional and interorganizational framework 
is appropriate.  Burton and Obel’s descriptors for the environment—equivocality, 
complexity, uncertainty, and hostility, reveal more specific organizational structure 
implications.  Equivocality focuses on agenda setting and confusion; it is similar to what 
Bardach explains as a preparatory collaborative step--“Reaching and maintaining 
consensus on basic goals and the tradeoffs among relevant sub-goals.”101  The LA TEW 
agenda was comparatively undetermined as it formed, but clarified later as group 
activities and TEW processes became routine and documented.  Complexity most likely 
changed very little, if at all; interdependence between organizations involved with LA’s 
counterterrorism planning and response remains “wicked.” Although the TEW has added 
private and non-profit organizations to the mix; overall complexity remains high.  High 
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uncertainty reflects confusion regarding the variables that must be monitored.  In 
terrorism planning and response, each functional organization brings to the table a 
capability to monitor its own set of specialized variables.  Collaborative IPO analysis, 
however, adds even more measures and trends to be monitored.  IPO broadens the 
outlook for indicators of terrorist activity while also emphasizing the importance of 
mutli- or all-source intelligence.  As this process has matured, it lessens uncertainty over 
the type of data that should be collected as well as the way in which that data supports 
operations.  Among the first responder organizations, inter-organizational political 
differences existed, but not to the extent where the organizational existence of any one 
organization was at stake.  Unlike the business world, the TEW did not have to show 
profit.  With the help of its parent organization, the Sheriff’s Department, the TEW faced 
little outright hostility.  However, individual organizations supported and participated in 
TEW activities according to their own view of the problem.  Most seemed to agree that 
‘win-win’ solutions were optimal; the difficult part was smoothing out the details to 
enable collaboration.  As the TEW concept is emulated in other localities, hostility to the 
TEW itself is reduced; the TEW organizational concept is now widely accepted. 
Given this environmental mix, Burton and Obel suggest propositions regarding 
resultant formalization, organizational complexity and centralization.  Uncertainty and 
complexity remain unchanged for the TEW, while equivocality has decreased slightly as 
the organization has reached some agreement on its agenda and mission.  Burton and 
Obel suggest that formalization, organizational complexity and centralization should all 
be low in such cases.  As equivocality decreases, a medium level of formalization may be 
possible.  They note: 
Medium formalization suggests a relatively small number of written rules.  
The rules apply to procedures to deal with the uncertainty.  In this case 
social formalization using professionals may be appropriate.102 
For Burton and Obel, low centralization also lessens the likelihood of information 
overload, as is possible in more traditional hierarchical organizations.  Organizational 
complexity refers to the degree of horizontal, vertical, and spatial differentiation in an 
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organization.103  The TEW combines horizontally differentiated functional organizations, 
links vertically differentiated entities and attempts to bring representatives together 
frequently in a shared forum—clearly attempting to simplify and desegregate the 
organizational landscape.  Therefore, it appears the TEW network approach with low 
centralization and low organizational complexity achieves environmental fit.  It has 
formalized slightly over time, to ensure continuity of its innovative processes.  
Documentation ensures that new TEW personnel understand the processes in place, so 
that when they want to suggest improvements, they can do so from an educated point of 
view.  As mentioned earlier, however, TEW “protocols” provide more of a reference 
rather than a set of rules written in stone.104 
Thus, the problem of terrorism and the number of organizations involved just 
within LA County alone necessitated a creative framework to integrate efforts of multiple 
organizations. The choice of networked counterterrorism organization not only matched 
the environment, but also addressed the need for efficient information flow, 
unencumbered by a bulky chain of command. 
 
B. CONSENSUS-BUILDING VIA TEW LEADERSHIP AND ANALYTICAL 
PROCESS  
Although environmental factors favored collaborative, networked structures, it is 
the way in which participants interpreted and acted upon those factors that determined the 
pace and method of network-building.  Overall, TEW structure and processes formed 
slowly, limiting hostility while maximizing organizational support for the TEW’s 
collaborative approach.  A review of the actors and actions of the network’s participants 
over time reveals an overall “meta-leadership” style for the network.105  Although the 
network was certainly “managed” to a certain degree by the Sheriff’s Department, who 
started the initiative, their actions aimed to facilitate more than to direct.  The TEW’s 
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non-aggressive collaboration facilitated the initial expansion of its network and 
contributes to the resilience of the organization today.   
At a general level, people and organizations consciously choose whether or not 
and to what extent to collaborate and work together; environmental factors cannot force 
collaborative “reflexes.”  Bardach mentions that organizations seeking collaboration need 
to develop an “interpersonal culture of trust and pragmatism” as well as a “system for 
building and maintaining consensus at the executive, or policy level.”  Achieving this 
problem-solving ethos then operationalizing it via consensus-building processes, 
however, takes time.  Bardach concludes, “It takes time, effort, skill, a mix of 
constructive personalities who are around long enough to build effective 
relationships.”106  In this case, an ingenious group of TEW pioneers was already familiar 
with existing county structures and knew personnel in key agencies across multiple levels 
of government.  They pitched their idea as an innovation to help the county, instead of 
offering criticism to prod organizations into participating.  Invitations to participate in the 
TEW were couched to keep inter-organizational hostility in check. 
From the start, the TEW was a home-grown, bottom-up approach intended to fill 
in the seams between existing structures which could cause failure in terrorism planning 
and response.107  It set up a network to achieve many of the same goals as the 128 
Venture Group Nohria studied; Nohria’s group brought existing entrepreneurial and 
financial resources together to facilitate collaborative business ventures that would not 
have been possible without creating new network links.  The group grew over time 
because participants and potential participants realized the value added its network 
provided; they realized the opportunities and benefits for themselves and others in 
expediting the communication needed to make new high-tech ventures profitable.  TEW 
original participants saw the same thing—seams between organizations involved in 
counterterrorism.  Although participants in Nohria’s 128 Venture group sought out 
partners for collaboration via the network, actual collaborative efforts normally only 
involved one or two financiers and entrepreneurs; the number of participants in TEW 
collaborative efforts is significantly higher. 
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The TEW outlook recognized that the problem extended beyond the purview of 
individual organizations and thus required a type of “cosmopolitan outlook” to facilitate 
network development.108  The TEW agenda focused on enabling broad-based 
collaboration—setting up processes to provide better terrorism-focused analytical support 
to the EOC.  Even before the first meeting, the organization had developed an early 
version of IPO; by continually revisiting the process and getting additional viewpoints, 
the collaborative analytical model emerged.  By agreeing to collaborate on solutions from 
the beginning, TEW participants made themselves open to innovative ideas. 
The Sheriff’s Department technically “leads” the TEW, as part of the EOC.  
However, the collaborative mission of the TEW requires a different type of approach to 
get beyond parochial organizational thinking and achieve cross-functional and cross-
agency coordinated efforts.  In this case, the personalities advocating the TEW (initially 
Sheriff’s Department personnel), did so based on their collective personal experiences, 
not only in emergency response, law enforcement and criminal investigation, but also 
prior experiences and academic studies in public policy, management, conventional 
military and special operations.109  These broadly experienced personnel provided a core 
of meta-leadership, which inspired the organization’s creative approach. 
Meta-leaders are able to accomplish the task, feeling and acting at ease 
even when engaging with people outside their professional domain or 
expertise, able to act comfortably in someone else’s space and making 
others feel welcomed and accepted in theirs.110 
The consensus-based TEW employed a different type of leadership, analysis, and 
organizational ethos.   
Specifically, the IPO focus on all-inclusive participation in the analytical process 
affirmed the intrinsic value of each and every participating organization in the process.  
Without any one of the participating organizations being involved in the process, certain 
information may be missing from the analytical puzzle.  However, with a combined, 
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meta-analytical perspective (and guidance of meta-leaders), subtle spikes in otherwise 
insignificant indicators may be detected.111 
A warning such as the spike is only effective if its fits into our mental 
model of what is going on.  As with the ‘warnings’ of Pearl Harbor, it can 
get swamped by the multitude of signals that fit our expectations, and thus 
be discounted as ‘noise’ in the system.112  
When combined with indicators from other organizations, “noise” may tip off additional 
investigative resources or analytical lines of thought.  By weighing all sources of 
intelligence, without overly weighting law enforcement information, the IPO process 
results in truly collaborative assessment.  The process itself fosters collaborative culture 
and promulgates that ethos back into participating organizations.  By reinforcing 
collaborative habits in participating organizations and individuals, the analytical process 
itself helps the network grow and sustain itself. 
 
C. TEW NETWORK EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS  
Over time, networks evolve.  This implies more than just a one-dimensional 
increase or decrease in the number of personnel or office symbols assigned.  Evolution 
incorporates the dynamic nature of networks—the fact that they themselves comprise 
actors who participate in events or processes and make decisions based on a diverse array 
of factors.  Although growth and expansion can be a part of evolution, the concepts 
exclude certain nuances of network change over time.  In reality, it is possible for a 
network to grow and contract at the same time; different parts of the network may 
experience different types of change.  Use of the broader “evolution” term in this study 
mirrors the distinction made earlier between cooperation, coordination and collaboration; 
collaboration is a more comprehensive concept, encompassing cooperation and 
coordination as sub-tasks.  Applying this perspective to the TEW’s collaborative 
network, it is appropriate to review not only the expansion of the network’s participants 
in terms of numbers and effective operational reach, but also changes in network 
processes and products or outcomes.  Tying collaboration and networking to social 
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network analysis ironically enables meta-analysis (across theoretical and methodological 
schools of thought) of how the TEW network links bridge organizational, functional and 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
Focusing on network expansion and reach, the TEW case shows how a group of 
ingenious upstarts with vision accomplished more with less—more collaborative capacity 
with less organizational resistance.  This bottom-up consensus-based network expansion 
contrasts sharply with top-down collaborative approaches.  Top-down approaches, such 
as the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center and Department of Homeland 
Security, address personnel and structural issues, but do not necessarily overcome 
ingrained non-collaborative, “silo-based” thinking that slows or halts inter-organizational 
efforts.  Marcus, et al, suggests three levels of cooperation:  people-to-people, on-paper, 
and in-practice.  Although the TEW duplicates some non-terrorist focused organizational 
structures (e.g., California’s SEMS) “on-paper,” the TEW’s track record proves that its 
well-honed people-to-people and in-practice capabilities provide more than just an 
alternative means of information flow.  The TEW network adds new analytical processes 
to the mix, so that the resultant network structure is not only stronger (via redundant 
relational connections) but also more resilient (via scalable links). 
The TEW succeeds on all of these levels; however, because of its bottom-up 
approach, many of the formal “on-paper” details were worked out long after processes 
had been worked out between individuals and put into practice113  Instead of using “hard 
power”-based executive orders to force information sharing, TEW meetings employed 
the “soft power” of outside experts and inter-personal connections to promote meaningful 
information sharing and combined problem-solving where organizations participate 
without uncomfortably sacrificing organizational authority.  Although the TEW has little 
hierarchical pull on its own, its meta-leadership and collaborative processes have 
combined to produce organizational “soft power.”  With a proven track record, the 
TEW’s newfound strength offers the potential for it to spur additional improvements in 
counterterrorism and emergency response. 
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TEW network expansion, however, is not without limits.  For now, many TEW 
network relations are based on personal relationships.  However, as the network expands, 
individuals will become less able maintain personal contact with their growing circle of 
collaborative partners.  Lacking familiarity, organizations and individuals may fall back 
on their parochial tendencies.  However, smart use of the TEW’s scalable network to tap 
into other networks only as needed may avert potential complications as the number of 
individual TEW network links increases.  So, in order to maintain and expand the 
network’s reach, TEW leaders must continue to build upon the existing collaborative 
ethos; the same openness that enabled the network to grow from its humble beginnings 
will sustain the organization’s current and future collaborative capacity.   
TEW expansion has meant mostly an extension of operational reach.  TEW links 
to other agencies at varying levels of government, or even in other countries, simply add 
to the resources available for the TEW.  Of course, in other localities across the country, 
localities may not require such an extensive network to meet their terrorism readiness 
requirements.  DHS’s UASI initiative envisions dozens of TEWs in metropolitan areas 
across the nation.  While this seems appropriate, it is important that local requirements be 
kept in mind as TEW-processes are emulated.  Meta-analysis incorporating all-source 
information may be an appropriate process to support the threat assessment needs of 
other localities; however, TEW network structure as implemented in Los Angeles may 
not be necessary in all cases.  In other words, the LA TEW’s relative success should not 
be used to justify cookie-cutter duplication of TEW’s across the nation without 
consideration of local variations.  As in Los Angeles, allowing locally tailored process 
implementation in other US cities and metropolitan areas may limit organizational 
resistance to change and result in long-term collaborative success. 
Wide use of the LA TEW model presents numerous opportunities for future 
research.  Comparative analysis of TEW’s may shed light on how collaboration occurs 
and how to foster collaborative capacity.  Given the potential of the LA JRIC, it may be 
appropriate to revisit the case to assess the effectiveness of that organization and its 
relationship to the multiple TEWs it supports.  Additionally, this study suggests analytical 
and leadership requirements specific to inter-organizational collaboration; further 
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investigation in this area may reveal education and training programs to support terrorist 
and non-terrorist related inter-organizational collaboration. 
Within the scope of this study, however, the TEW demonstrates an example of 
organizational problem solving where a network facilitated collaboration in a wickedly 
complex and uncertain environment.  The network’s consensus-based innovation, 
collaborative processes, and meta-leadership helped the network evolve; these factors 
strengthened the collaborative ethos of the network and set the stage for success as the 
network meets current and future challenges.  As a mechanism to increase local 
counterterrorism and emergency response capabilities, the TEW certainly succeeds.  At a 
much broader level, the TEWs strategic outlook and innovations make the network a 
unique case, especially when contrasted to many top-down organizational restructuring 
efforts. 
Like Paul Revere, the TEW’s “rolodex” is brimming with network connections 
ready to be tapped and called to duty.  Revere’s midnight ride to pass early warning 
information and intelligence assessments would not have made history were it not for the 
way in which the network acted upon this information.  For the TEW, the way in which 
its collaborative assessments are used may ensure success in modern revolutionary 
netwar as well as non-revolutionary emergency response.  Lessons from TEW evolution 
provide insight into how to facilitate collaborative action and build collaborative capacity 
for the future. 
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